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Abstract
The Preˆt a` Voter election scheme provides high
assurance of accuracy and secrecy, due to the high
degree of transparency and auditability. However,
the assurance arguments are subtle and involve
some understanding of the role of cryptography.
As a result, establishing public understanding and
trust in such systems remains a challenge. It is
essential that a voting system be not only trust-
worthy but also widely trusted.
In response to this concern, we propose to add a
mechanism to Preˆt a` Voter to generate a conven-
tional (i.e. human readable) paper audit trail that
can be invoked should the outcome of the crypto-
graphic count be called into question. It is hoped
that having such a familiar mechanism as a safety
net will encourage public confidence. Care has to
be taken to ensure that the mechanism does not
undermine the carefully crafted integrity and pri-
vacy assurances of the original scheme.
We show that, besides providing a confidence
building measure, this mechanism brings with it a
number of interesting technical features: it allows
extra audits of mechanisms that capture and pro-
cess the votes to be performed. The mechanism
proposed also has the benefit of providing a robust
counter to the danger of voters undermining the
receipt-freeness of property by trying to retain the
candidate list.
1 Introduction
There has been much concern lately as to the
trustworthiness of electronic voting systems such
as touch screen devices, where the integrity of
the count depends heavily on the correctness of
the code running on the voting machines. Re-
searchers have pointed out the ease with which
the count could be manipulated in virtually un-
detectable ways [10]. One response to these con-
cerns, originally proposed by Mercury [13], is to
incorporate a Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail
(VVPAT), essentially a paper copy of the voter’s
intent that is printed in the booth and checkable
by the voter. Whilst such a mechanism is doubt-
less an improvement on the situation in which the
count is retained solely in software, with no paper
back-up at all, there are still problems:
• Paper audit trails are not invulnerable to cor-
ruption.
• If the paper record does not agree with the
voter’s selection, it may be tricky to resolve,
especially without undermining the privacy of
the ballot.
• It is not clear under what circumstances the
audit trail should be invoked.
• It is not clear how any conflicts between the
computer and paper audit counts should be
resolved.
• Humans are notoriously bad at proof-reading,
especially their own material, and hence bad
at detecting errors in a record of their choices
[3].
An alternative response is to devise schemes
that provide high levels of assurance via a high
degree of transparency and with minimal depen-
dency on technology. Such schemes provide Voter-
verifiability in a different sense: voters have a way
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to confirm that their vote is included in a univer-
sally auditable tabulation that is performed on an
append-only Web Bulletin Board (WBB) [6].
Preˆt a` Voter [26, 25, 1, 20, 21, 22, 24, 11, 12, 29]
is a particularly voter-friendly example of such
high assurance, trustworthy voting schemes. It
aims to provide guarantees of accuracy of the
count and ballot privacy that are independent of
software, hardware etc. Assurance of accuracy
flows from maximal transparency of the process,
consistent with maintaining ballot privacy.
Verifiable schemes like Preˆt a` Voter, VoteHere
[14], and PunchScan [5], arguably provide higher
levels of assurance than even conventional pen-
and-paper elections, and certainly far higher as-
surance than systems that are dependant on the
correctness of (often proprietary) code. However,
the assurance arguments are subtle and it is un-
reasonable to expect the electorate at large to un-
derstand them. Whether the assurances of experts
would be enough to reassure the various stakehold-
ers is unclear. This is probably especially true
during the early phase of introduction of such sys-
tems until a track record has been established. It
seems sensible therefore to explore the possibility
of incorporating more conventional mechanisms to
support public confidence.
Randell and Ryan [17] explored the possibil-
ity of voter-verifiable schemes without the use of
cryptography. This tried to achieve similar in-
tegrity, verifiablity and privacy goals but using
only more familiar, physical mechanisms such as
scratch strips. The resulting levels of assurance,
in the technical sense, are not as high as for Preˆt
a` Voter.
A more recent proposal is ThreeBallot due to
Rivest [18]. This does indeed provide voter-
verifiability but at the cost of a non-trivial voter
interface: voters a required to mark three ballots
in such a way as to encode their vote (two votes
for their candidate of choice, one for all others)
and to retain one ballot, chosen at random. Be-
sides the non-trivial voter interface, a number of
vulnerabilities in ThreeBallot have been identified,
several in Rivest’s original paper. It is probably
fair to conclude that ThreeBallot, whilst being a
conceptual breakthrough, does not, as it stands,
provide a viable scheme for real elections.
Here we explore a rather different route: sup-
plementing a cryptographic scheme with a con-
ventional paper audit trail backup that we re-
fer to as a Human Readable Paper Audit Trail
(HRPAT). Introducing such a mechanism may in-
troduce certain vulnerabilities not present in the
original scheme. However, it may be argued that
it is worth introducing such risks, at least during
trials and early phases of deployment.
In this paper we propose an approach that we
believe minimises such risks whilst maximising the
reassurance of having a conventional mechanism
as a backup. Once sufficient levels of trust and
confidence have been established in a verifiable,
trustworthy scheme like Preˆt a` Voter, we would
hope that the scaffolding of a human-readable pa-
per audit trail could be cast aside.
Besides the confidence building aspects we find
that the HRPAT mechanism can provide a number
of unexpected technical benefits. It can provide a
robust counter to the danger of voters attempting
to leave the polling station with the left hand ele-
ment of the Preˆt a` Voter ballot form. This shows
the candidate order and so could provide a poten-
tial coercer with proof of the vote. A number of
possible counter-measures to this threat have been
identified previously, for example the provision of
decoy candidate lists [21, 23], but the mechanism
here appears to be particularly robust. The pro-
cedure we propose here involves the officials veri-
fying that the voter submits the component of the
ballot that carries the candidate order at the time
of casting.
The approach proposed here also enables a
number of additional auditing procedures to be in-
troduced that significantly increase the assurance
of accuracy, assuming that the integrity of the pa-
per audit trail can be ensured.
The second author previously proposed a Veri-
fied Encrypted Paper Audit Trail (VEPAT) mech-
anism [27]. Whilst this enhances assurance from
a technical point of view, the audit trail is not
human-readable and so it does not really help with
public perception and confidence. It is hoped that
the scheme proposed here should be more familiar
and understandable.
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Figure 1. Preˆt a` Voter ballot form
X
7304944
Figure 2. Preˆt a` Voter ballot receipt (encoding
a vote for “Idefix”)
2 Outline of Preˆt a` Voter
The key innovation of the Preˆt a` Voter approach
is to encode the vote using a randomised candidate
list. Suppose that our voter is called Anne. At the
polling station, Anne chooses at random a ballot
form sealed in an envelope; an example of such a
form is shown in Figure 1.
In the booth, Anne extracts her ballot form
from the envelope and makes her selection in the
usual way by placing a cross in the right hand col-
umn against the candidate of her choice (or, in the
case of a Single Transferable Vote (STV) system
for example, she marks her ranking against the
candidates). Once her selection has been made,
she separates the left and right hand strips along
a perforation and discards the left hand strip. She
is left with the right hand strip which now con-
stitutes her privacy protected receipt, as shown in
Figure 2.
Anne now exits the booth clutching her receipt,
registers with an official, and casts her receipt.
Her receipt is placed over an optical reader or sim-
ilar device that records the random value at the
bottom of the strip and records in which cell her
X is marked. This digital copy of her receipt is
posted to a secure Web Bulletin Board (WBB).
Her original, paper receipt is digitally signed and
franked and returned to her to keep.
The randomisation of the candidate list on each
ballot form ensures that the receipt does not reveal
the way she voted, thus ensuring the secrecy of
her vote. Incidentally, it also removes any bias
towards the candidate at the top of the list that
can occur with a fixed ordering.
The value printed on the bottom of the receipt,
that we refer to as the onion, is the key to ex-
traction of the vote during the tabulation phase.
Buried cryptographically in this value is the in-
formation needed to reconstruct the candidate or-
der and so extract the vote encoded on the re-
ceipt. This information is encrypted with secret
keys shared across a number of tellers. Thus, only
a threshold set of tellers acting together are able
to interpret the vote encoded on the receipt.
After the election, voters (or perhaps prox-
ies acting on their behalf) can visit the secure
Web Bulletin Board (WBB) and confirm their re-
ceipts appear correctly. Once any discrepancies
are resolved, the tellers take over and perform
anonymising mixes and decryption of the receipts.
All the intermediate stages of this process are com-
mitted to the WBB for later audit. Various audit-
ing mechanisms are in place to ensure that all the
steps, the creation of the ballot forms, the mixing
and decryption etc are performed correctly. These
are carefully designed so as not to impinge on bal-
lot privacy. Full details can be found in, for ex-
ample, [28].
An early version of the Preˆt a` Voter system used
a decryption mix network to break the link be-
tween an encrypted receipt and the plaintext vote
[1]. We call this configuration of the system Preˆt
a` Voter 2005. When the decryption mix network
was exchanged for a re-encryption mix network in
Preˆt a` Voter 2006 [24] this made provisions for a
range of measures that protect the secrecy of the
election, for example the on-demand printing of
ballot forms in the booth. A further extension of
the system exchanged the Elgamal encryption for
Paillier [20].
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2.1 The Security Properties
Cryptographic schemes, like those in the Preˆt a`
Voter class, strive to provide the following prop-
erties:
1. Accuracy
2. Ballot privacy and coercion resistance
3. Voter-verifiablity
Accuracy can be thought of as the requirement
that all legitimately cast votes should be included
in the tabulation. We will assume that a cor-
rect register of legitimate voters is maintained and
that mechanisms are in place to authenticate vot-
ers and ensure that each voter can cast at most
one vote.
Ballot privacy requires that, for any given voter,
it should be impossible for anyone, other than the
voter, to determine how they voted. Coercion re-
sistance requires that this property should hold
even if the voter is prepared to cooperate with a
coercer throughout the vote casting protocol.
Voter-verifiability requires that voters should
have a way to confirm that their votes are accu-
rately included in the tabulation. Clearly this has
to be done in a way that does not violate coercion
resistance.
Preˆt a` Voter allows all voters to check that their
votes were recorded as intended by the electronic
voting system and then the public verifiability al-
lows any interested organisation or individual to
check that all recorded, encrypted votes are trans-
formed into countable plain text votes correctly.
The latter is fully auditable because of the cryp-
tography used but the previous is dependent on
a certain number of voters checking their receipts
on a web site.
The goal is to provide high assurance that these
properties are guaranteed for any election without
needing to trust any component of the system,
be it software, hardware or humans. Rivest has
coined the term software independence to refer to
this design requirement [19].
Analysis of the Preˆt a` Voter schemes indicates
that, aside from certain vulnerabilities and sub-
ject to certain assumptions, they fulfill the above
requirements. We refer the reader to the various
papers and tech reports for the details.
The scheme that we describe here inherits most
of the properties of Preˆt a` Voter 2006. For the
accuracy requirement it can be argued that this
scheme provides higher guarantees if we assume
that the integrity of the paper audit trail can be
guaranteed. Regarding the privacy requirements
there is a danger that the HRPAT mechanism may
undermine the carefully wrought properties of the
2006 scheme. We will discuss the differences in the
security guarantees provided by Preˆt a` Voter 2006
and the scheme of this paper in our conclusions.
3 Preliminaries
In this section we introduce some of the primi-
tives that we need in what follows.
3.1 Threshold ElGamal
We recall the probabilistic algorithm due to El-
Gamal, [4]: given a large prime p and a generator
α of a q-order subgroup of Z∗p . A party A chooses
a secret key k and computes β:
β := αk (mod p)
The public key is p, α and β. k is the secret key.
Encryption of m yields a pair of terms computed
thus:
c := (y1, y2) := (αr,m · βr) (mod p)
where r is chosen at random. A decrypts c as
follows:
m = y2/yk1 (mod p)
The security of ElGamal rests on the pre-
sumed difficulty of taking discrete logs in a fi-
nite field. Thus, recovering the secret k exponent
from knowledge of p, α and β is thought to be in-
tractable.
A randomising algorithm like ElGamal allows
the possibility of re-encryption: anyone who
knows the public keys can re-randomise the origi-
nal encryption with a new random value r′:
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(y′1, y
′
2) := (α
r′ · y1, βr′ · y2)
which gives:
(y′1, y
′
2) := (α
r′+r, βr
′+r ·m)
Clearly, this is equivalent to simply encrypting
m with the randomisation r + r′ and decryption
is performed exactly as before. We will see the
utility of re-encryption when we come to describe
anonymising mixes. Note that, crucially, the de-
vice performing the re-encryption does not use any
secret keys and at no point in the re-encryption
process is the plaintext revealed.
In fact we will use exponential ElGamal, where
m is encrypted as:
c := (y1, y2) := (αr, αm · βr) (mod p)
Thus the plaintext is carried in the exponent of
α. This is convenient when we come to transform
the receipts to pure ElGamal terms prior to mix-
ing. It does mean however that we have to limit
the plaintext space to avoid having to extract dis-
crete logs to obtain the plaintext. Furthermore, we
will use a threshold form of ElGamal. We omit the
details and refer the reader to [16], for example.
4 The scheme
In this section we first present the HRPAT Preˆt
a` Voter ballot form with its onions and how they
are created and printed. We then describe the
on-demand printing of the candidate list and the
method by which votes are cast. Finally we show
how the encrypted receipts are decrypted and how
the HRPAT can be used to verify the electronic
election.
4.1 The ballot form and its use
The ballot form is altered to have two pages.
The bottom page has two portions. The left hand
portion carries an onion and a serial number. The
top page overlays the right column of the bottom
sheet and carries another onion value. The top
POST
onionL
serial
RETAIN
onionR
Figure 3. The ballot form in two pages
RETAIN
onionL onionR
serial
Figure 4. The ballot form complete
RETAIN
candidateB
candidateC
candidateA
onionL onionR
serial
Figure 5. The ballot form with candidates
printed
RETAIN
candidateB
candidateC X
candidateA
onionL onionR
serial
Figure 6. The ballot form with marks
POST
candidateB
candidateC X
candidateA
onionL
serial
RETAIN
X
onionR
Figure 7. The marked ballot form in two pages
5
page has a carbon layer or similar on the back to
ensure that marks applied to the top page trans-
fer to the bottom page. The layout of the ballot
form is shown in Figure 3. This means that when
the top page is aligned over the right column of
the bottom page the complete ballot form looks
as shown in Figure 4. When the voter makes her
mark in the right hand column of this complete
form the mark is made on both pages.
The reader will notice that there are no candi-
date names printed in Figure 3. This is because
we are incorporating the on-demand printing of
ballot forms introduced in previous papers [24].
When the voter has identified herself to the poll
station workers she is allowed to randomly choose
a ballot form such as that in Figure 4. At this
stage onionL and onionR are concealed (for ex-
ample by a scratch strip) so that they cannot be
read by either the poll station worker nor anyone
else at the polling station. The other value, serial,
is noted in the register next to the voter’s name.
The voter takes the form into the voting booth
where she makes onionL visible and then allows
a machine to read this value. The machine de-
crypts of the onion, as will be explained later, and
from this computes the candidate list, which it
now prints in the left column of the ballot form.
The result is depicted in Figure 5.
The voter now makes her mark(s) on the form
in the privacy of the voting booth and the result
is exemplified in Figure 6. She then detaches the
top page from the bottom and the result is shown
in Figure 7. The voter places the page marked
POST into an envelope through which only the
serial number is visible and then leaves the booth
carrying the envelope and the top page, which will
constitute her receipt. She now presents herself to
the vote casting desk and hands over the envelope
and receipt. The poll station worker checks that
serial is the same as the one previously assigned
to the voter. Once this is done, the serial number
is detached and discarded and the envelope con-
taining the lower page is placed in the ballot box.
The page marked RETAIN is scanned, a digital
copy posted to the WBB and handed back to the
the voter to keep as her protected receipt.
The serial number serves a dual purpose here:
firstly it counters chain-voting attacks as sug-
gested by Jones [8]. Secondly, it serves to verify
that the voter does not retain the lower layer of
their ballot form. This is a useful spin-off of the
HRPAT mechanism: in the standard Preˆt a` Voter,
there is the possibility of the voter retaining the
LH portion of the ballot form, along with her re-
ceipt, to prove to a coercer how she voted.
4.2 Cut-and-choose
The Preˆt a` Voter ballot form is printed on paper
and for the election to be guaranteed accurate and
to instill trust in the voters, it has previously been
envisaged that a number of forms that are not used
to cast votes are audited, that is to say they are
decrypted before the close of the election to show
that they have been correctly printed [2, 21]. One
possibility is to have a double sided form, one side
of which (selected at random by the voter) is used
to cast the vote and the other is automatically
audited [23, 24]. However, any such “cut-and-
choose” mechanism only allows forms that are not
used to be audited.
In the scheme presented here, we add a paper
audit trail to Preˆt a` Voter. As has been shown
above, the candidate list is printed on the bottom
page of the ballot form and this page is placed
in a ballot box and provides the human readable
paper audit trail. Because of the properties of
the relation between the two pages as shown in
this section, it is possible to audit the printing of
the candidate list of any number of forms after
the close of the election. The device or authority
printing the form would thus be caught with a
probability proportional to the number of forms
audited. Hence the HRPAT method shown in this
paper has this further audit application.
4.3 Generation of the encrypted ballot forms
We describe a distributed, parallel construction
of the onion pairs. Suppose that we have L clerks.
They will be responsible for generating I onion
pairs, where each onion pair will carry the same
seed/plainext.
We further suppose that we have a public key
for the tellers PKT and public keys for the Booths
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PKBk . Both of these public keys will have the
same modulus. We provide the construction for
a single booth key; we simply replicate the con-
struction for other booth keys. Denote the public
key of the booth in question as PKB.
The jth clerk generates I sub-onion pairs:
{θTj,i; θBj,i}
Where:
θTj,i := {sj,i, xj,i}PKT
and
θBj,i := {sj,i, yj,i}PKB
The first term is an encryption of the j, ith seed
under the Teller’s public key. The second term is
the encryption of the same seed value under the
booth’s public key. The randomisations x, y, used
for these two encryptions should be independent.
All of these sub-onions are all posted to a WBB
in cells of an L × I matrix (L columns, I rows)
— one pair in each cell. To audit these, an in-
dependent auditing entity chooses for each row a
randomly selected subset of the cells in the row,
say half. For these selected cells the clerks reveal
the s, x and y values. The auditor can check that
the encryptions match the posted sub-onion val-
ues and that the two seed values are equal for each
pair.
Assuming the posted material passes the audits,
the “full” onions are formed by taking the product
of the remaining, un-audited pairs row-wise. This
step is universally verifiable. Let Ai denote the set
of indices of the pairs selected for audit in the ith
row. Then the “full” onions for the i th row are
computed as:
ΘTi :=
∏
j∈A¯
θTj,i
ΘBi :=
∏
j∈A¯
θBj,i
To create the proto-ballots, suppose that we
have paper ballots forms that initially just carry
index values from I, each form will carry a unique
index value. We now introduce two new processes
P1, P2. P1 takes a form with index i, looks up ΘTi
on the WBB, re-encrypts it and prints the result
on the RH portion of form. It then covers this
with a scratch strip. Once it has finished a batch
of these, they are shuﬄed and passed on to P2.
P2 looks up the appropriate ΘBi , re-encrypts
this and prints the resulting value on the LH por-
tion of the ballot and covers it with a scratch strip.
We perform audits on a randomly selected sub-
set of the resulting proto-ballots. For the selected
ballots, the onions are revealed and P1 and P2 are
required to prove the re-encryption link back to
the onion pair on the WBB. Audited forms are
marked are discarded.
Our construction ensures that it would take a
3-way collusion, the booth and P1 and P2, to link
the T (receipt) onions to the candidate lists. The
index value on the ballots can serve as the serial
number, and is removed at the time of casting.
4.4 Anonymising Tabulation
Anonymising tabulation proceeds exactly as for
Preˆt a` Voter 2006. We outline it here for com-
pleteness. The encrypted receipts scanned in the
polling station are published on the web bulletin
board and all voters are able to check that their re-
ceipts appear there. When all tellers are satisfied
that the election has ended and all electoral rules
have been followed they start the decryption pro-
cess, which is shown in Table 1. The first teller, T1,
takes all encrypted receipts and injects the voter’s
choice(s) into the onionR, using the homomorphic
properties of exponential ElGamal. We call the
onion with the injected choice(s) onionI . There-
fore:
onionI := onionR ∗ {V, r}PKT
The index number V indicates the position of
the X on the receipt. The result is:
onionI = {V − s, t}PKT
Thus, the I onion is the encryption of the V
index minus the seed value. The offset φ of the
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Inject Re-encryption Plaintext
onionR choices onionI mix network onionIn Decryption vote
OR2 ⇒ OI2 OI5 ⇒ V5
OR1 ⇒ OI1 OI2 ⇒ V2
OR4 ⇒ OI4 OI3 ⇒ V3
OR5 ⇒ OI5 OI4 ⇒ V4
OR3 ⇒ OI3 OI1 ⇒ V1
Table 1. Decryption of the encrypted receipts
candidate list printed on the ballot form is com-
puted as φ := s (mod n), where n is the number of
candidates. Thus, V −s (mod n) gives the index of
the candidate chosen by the voter in the canonical
numbering of the candidates.
No mixing is performed at this step: the I and
R onions are posted side-by-side on the WBB.
That each onionI is correcly formed w.r.t. onionR
is thus universally verifiable. s is the seed hidden
within the encryption.
We now perform a sequence of re-encryption
mixes, performed by a set of mix tellers. Each mix
teller takes the full batch of onionIs, re-encrypts
each onion, shuﬄes the batch and outputs to the
next mix teller. The output batch from each teller
is published onto the web bulletin board. The last
output batch we call onionIn .
When all mix tellers have performed their re-
encryption mixes, the independent auditors con-
firm that the mixes have all been performed cor-
rectly. This might be done using partial random
checking [7], or perhaps Neff’s proofs of ElGa-
mal shuﬄes [15]. If the auditors confirm that the
mixes are correct, we can proceed to the decryp-
tion stage. If problems are identified with the
mixes, corrective actions can be taken. Thus, for
example, if one of the mix tellers is identified as
having cheated, it can be removed and replaced.
The mixes can be re-computed from the point on-
wards and re-audited. We might routinely re-run
the mixes and audits in any case for additional
assurance.
Once we are happy that the mixes have been
performed correctly, a threshold set of the decryp-
tion tellers take over and cooperate to decrypt
each onionIn . No mixing is required at this stage
and each step of the decryption can be accom-
panied with a ZK proof of correct (partial) de-
cryption. The final, fully decrypted values can be
translated into the corresponding candidate values
using:
candidatei = (s+ v) (mod n))
Such re-encryption mixes are known to provide
anonymity against a passive attacker. Against an
active attacker, who might have some capability to
inject or alter terms entered into the mix, we have
to guard against ballot doubling attacks: to iden-
tify a particular voter’s choice, he injects a term
that is a re-randomisation of the voter’s receipt.
If unchecked, this will result in two decrypted re-
ceipts with the same adjusted seed value. We
will in any case have procedures in place to guard
against ballot stuffing that will help counter such
dangers. An additional measure is to run (thresh-
old) plaintext equivalence checks against the terms
in the mix prior to decryption, see [9].
4.5 Audit of the paper trail
There are now a number of strategies for au-
diting the election. One possible scenario is to
perform a full, manual recount of the election us-
ing the HRPAT. In practice, due to inevitable er-
rors with manual counting, this will differ from
the electronic count, even if the later is exact and
correct. If the difference is small and well within
the winning margin, this could probably be disre-
garded.
An alternative is to take a random subset of the
HRPAT ballots and, for each of these forms, the
auditor requires the tellers to decrypt the onion
and so reveal the seed s. The tellers are required
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to provide ZK proofs of the correctness of their de-
cryption steps. From the seed value s it computes
the candidate order and checks that this agrees
with the list printed on the ballot. It then recom-
putes the onion value and checks that this agrees
with the value printed on the ballot.
This audit serves to catch any cheating by
booths that might not have been detected earlier
during the cut-and-choose audit. The advantage
of these audits is that we are checking the actual
candidate orders used by the voters to cast their
votes rather than those on unused ballots.
We can now perform some checks of correspon-
dence between the paper audit trial and the de-
crypted ballots posted from the tabulating mixes.
For each selected paper audit ballot, the auditor
now computes the adjusted seed value:
s¯ := V − s
It should now be able to find a matching value
amongst the decrypted outputs of the tabulation
process on the WBB. Failure to find a matching
value casts doubt on the conduct of the election.
If the auditor finds an adjusted seed value in the
tabulation that differs slightly from the seed value
from the paper audit trial this may be indicative
of corruption. This might be due to some manip-
ulation of the paper audit trial or the electronic
records. Further investigation would now be re-
quired, firstly to establish that the paper ballot is
genuine. Another step might be to perform PET
checks of the paper ballot onion against the posted
receipt onions. If a match were found this would
prove that an error had slipped through in the
mix/tabulation phase.
Of course, the J onions computed now will have
different randomisations from the corresponding I
onions computed previously. However, as long as
all computations have been performed correctly,
the sets of onionIs, onionIns and onionJs contain
the same plaintexts. In other words, The J onions
should be related to the I by a re-encryption and
shuﬄe. We could test this hypothesis by perform-
ing a full PET matching of the I and J onions or,
perhaps more realistically, performing some spot
checks on a random selection.
5 Analysis
Rather than attempt a full analysis of the
scheme, we will discuss the respects in which it
differs from Preˆt a` Voter 2006. In terms of the ac-
curacy guarantees we will see that this scheme pro-
vides stronger guarantees that Preˆt a` Voter 2006,
assuming the integrity of the paper audit trial. If
the paper audit trial is vulnerable to manipula-
tion, then arguably the HRPAT mechanism could
undermine the assurance of the original scheme.
On the other hand, we have introduced some
threats to ballot privacy that were not present
in Preˆt a` Voter 2006. It is of course difficult to
gauge whether this is a good trade-off, and this
judgement will probably vary according to circum-
stance, perceived threats etc.
5.1 Linking the receipt onions to the candidate
lists
The fact that in this scheme, the ballot forms
carry linked onions on both portions does create
potential threats against ballot privacy. The link
is cryptographically protected and cannot be di-
rectly re-established without access to a threshold
set of teller’s keys. However, there is a danger that
if booth keys are compromised, it may be possible
to obtain the seeds for some ballots and link these
to the decrypted values posted on the WBB. The
coercer still has to link the HRPAT ballot to the
voter who used it. He can do this if he can es-
tablish the link between the two onions. However,
our construction ensures that it would require a
collusion of the both the P1 and P2 processes to
reveal these links.
We see that the HRPAT mechanism does in-
troduce some threats against ballot privacy that
are absent in conventional Preˆt a` Voter. However,
we have striven to ensure that the threshold to
exploit such vulnerabilities is quite high. It is a
delicate trade-off to establish whether the intro-
duction of such vulnerabilities is justified by the
added assurance and confidence resulting from the
HRPAT mechanism.
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Re-encryption
onionL mix network onionM
OL2 OM2
OL3 OM1
OL1 OM4
OL5 OM5
OL4 OM3
All tellers
Table 2. Another re-encryption mix of onionL
5.2 Voter choices differ between pages
As the voter must make her marks on the form
in the privacy of the booth, it is possible for a
malicious or coerced voter to introduce different
marks on the two pages. To resolve this and to
prove that the marks were made differently on
each sheet by the voter the tellers can take the list
of onionLs and run them through a re-encryption
mix to form a list of onionM s, as shown in Table
2. It is then possible to use the PET strategy to
prove which onionM contains the same informa-
tion as the onionL, the extension of which is that
the bottom page is valid but the voter’s mark does
not match. If the tellers, when prompted, find
that onionL with the voter’s choice Vbottom does
not have the same plaintext as onionR with the
choice Vtop injected then they prove that onionL
has the same plaintext as onionM to show that
the marks are different on each of the pages.
6 Conclusions
We have presented a mechanism that can be in-
corporated in Preˆt a` Voter to generate a plaintext
paper audit trail. This has a number of benefits:
firstly there is the confidence building effect of hav-
ing a paper audit trail as a safety-net. Secondly
it provides a number of additional auditing pos-
sibilities: spot checks of correspondence between
the paper ballots and decrypted ballots as well as
checks on the correctness of the candidate order
printed on the ballots by the booth devices. Note
that these checks are applied directly to the can-
didate orders used by the voters, rather than on
unused, audited forms as with the cut-and-choose
audits.
A further benefit is to provide a mechanism to
ensure that voters do submit the portion of the
ballot that carries the candidate order, so counter-
ing dangers of voters attempting to smuggle these
out to prove prove their vote to a coercer.
On the other hand, the HRPAT mechanism pre-
sented here does introduce some threats against
ballot privacy that are not present in conventional
Preˆt a` Voter. Evaluating this trade-off requires
more systematic ways to evaluate voting systems
than exist at present. Besides, it is likely that
such trade-offs will be highly dependent on the
context. For example, in the UK, it is required by
law to maintain a link between voter id and bal-
lots forms. Thus, in the UK, a mechanism along
the lines proposed would not only be acceptable
but would probably be required.
Another issue to be borne in mind, is that the
paper audit trail may be vulnerable to manipula-
tion. This is true of conventional pen and paper
voting, but here it may be particularly problem-
atic as such manipulation may serve to cast doubt
on a completely valid electronic count. Again, this
is a delicate trade-off against the comfort factor of
having a paper audit trail fall-back.
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